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The A u stra lian  G overnm ent and  Involvem ent in th e  V ietnam  W a r
Peter Edwards
W hen I say to an American that I am working on a m ajor history 
o f Australia's involvement in the post-1945 southeast Asian conflicts, 
culm inating in the Vietnam war, I usually meet one o f two reactions. The 
first is obvious surprise that Australia was involved in Vietnam. W hen 
Am ericans refer to Vietnam, they generally mean “the United States in 
Vietnam ”. Am erican histories o f the war, whether intended for a popular 
ora scholarly readership, usually have little to say about the involvement 
o f allies. The proverbial visitor from outer space could read books 
totalling hundreds, even thousands, o f pages on how the United States 
became involved and, with only the briefest lapses in concentration, not 
become aware that American allies were present at all. The second 
reaction is usually encountered from Am ericans who themselves served 
in Vietnam. They often have no difficulty in recalling that Australians 
were present in Vietnam, a recollection generally accompanied by a smile 
and something sim ilar to the words: “Boy, could those guys put away 
beer!”
The ability o f Americans to recall whether Australians fought 
with them in Vietnam is more important than it may seem. One o f the 
fundamental m otives for Australian involvement was to produce a sense 
o f gratitude on the part o f Americans, both in official circles and in the 
general public. It was, to use a phrase much used at the time, an 
insurance policy, a premium paid in Vietnam towards an assurance of 
support for Australia against problems which already existed or which 
might arise in the future, possibly even closer to Australia’s shores. But 
it was more than just an insurance policy. Australia had its own 
concerns about communism in southeast Asia, concerns that ran 
parallel to those of the United States. Policy-makers in Australia ’s 
capital, Canberra, supported the domino theory as vigorously as their 
counterparts in Washington. Indeed, the concern was probably even 
greater because in its more extreme versions (including President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s celebrated statement o f April 1954) Australia 
itself was seen as one of the last dominoes in the sequence that began 
in Indochina.
At the same time, a small to middle power located on the fringes 
o f southeast Asia inevitably had different priorities from those of a 
superpower an ocean away from Indochina. There were therefore both 
similarities and differences between the paths taken by the United 
States and Australia towards involvement in Vietnam. This paper is
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intended to give an overview, for an American readership, o f some of 
those parallels and differences.'
To set out the major steps in the development of Australian policy 
will indicate many of the parallels. Australia recognized the state of 
Vietnam, established with French sponsorship under the former emperor 
Bao Dai, on 8 February 1950, the day after the United Kingdom and the 
United States had done so. Australian officials were well aware of the 
fragility o f the Stale o f Vietnam, and of the strong popular support for the 
rival Democratic Republic o f Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh; but in the 
interests of the worldwide struggle against communism, the Australian 
Government felt it had no choice but to support the Bao Dai gamble. In 
1953 it invited Jean Letoumeau, the French minister in charge of 
relations with the Associated States (as Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia 
were then known), to visit Australia. Letoumeau was offered arms and 
equipment for the French war in Indochina. The materiel that was 
eventually sent in 1953 and 1954 largely comprised obsolescent 
equipment, and was in any case a token gesture by comparison with the 
enormous economic and military assistance being given by the United 
States. Nevertheless, Australia was clearly signalling that it regarded the 
war in Indochina, not as merely a colonial rearguard action by France, 
but as a struggle between communism and democracy (or, at least, 
potential democracy).
In 1954 Australia had only observer status at the Geneva 
Conference, where its main diplomacy was sorely tested by the attempt 
simultaneously to maintain close and cordial relations with both the 
United Kingdom and the United Stales. Immediately after the Geneva 
accords, Canberra shared the widespread pessimism over the future of 
the non-communist regimes in Indochina, and unhesitatingly became a 
founder member of the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) 
at Manila. In the late 1950s, Australia shared the growing optimism over 
Ngo Dinh Diem’s apparent success in sustaining the Republic of 
Vietnam (RVN). In 1957, soon after visiting the United States to be hailed 
as a “miracle man” by Eisenhower, Diem became the first foreign head 
of state to visit Australia, where his welcome was almost equally 
enthusiastic.
As the communist-led insurgency grew in the early 1960s, 
Australian military involvement ran parallel to that of the United States, 
albeit on a far smaller scale. A  team of advisers, initially comprising 30 
officers and non-commissioned officers, was committed in 1962, growing 
to83 in  1964 and 100 in 1965. InApril 1965 the first battalion of infantry 
was committed to Vietnam. In 1966 the commitment was increased to 
a two-battalion Task Force, and in 1967 the Task Force was further 
augmented by a third battalion. Units of the Royal Australian Navy and 
the Royal Australian Air Force were also committed. At the height of the 
war Australia had about 8000 service personnel in Vietnam at any one 
time. In 1971 the withdrawal of the Task Force began and by the end of
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1972 virtually all Australian military personnel had been withdrawn, 
apart from an embassy guard. In all, about 50,000 service personnel 
served in Vietnam and 500 lost their lives.2
All o f this will sound familiar, suggesting perhaps a microcosmic 
imitation o f the American commitment. But there were significant 
differences between Australia’s and America’s paths to Vietnam. The 
first concerns the role of the Australian-American relationship itself, a 
topic obviously o f much greater concern to Canberra than to Washington. 
While Australian policy-makers shared much of the American perception 
of a threat o f communist expansionism in southeast Asia, they were as 
conscious of Australia’s weakness as the United States was o f its military 
might. If critics o f American policy referred to “the arrogance of power”, 
critics of Australian attitudes referred to the “frightened country", the 
nation that had an almost pathological fear of being “the last domino”.3 
Curiously, given the longstanding fears in the Australian community of 
threats from the north, much of the weakness was self-induced. In the 
early 1950s, during the Korean War, serious efforts were made to 
improve Australia’s defence capacity but thereafter, for the remainder of 
the decade, defence expenditure was kept artificially low. The Government 
argued that its most useful contribution to the struggle against 
communism was to develop the country’s economic base: investment 
was therefore directed towards “national development” rather than to 
defence.
This kind of thinking lay behind the frequent references by 
Robert Gordon (from 1963 Sir Robert) Menzies, Prime Minister from 
1949 to 1966, to the importance of Australia’s “great and powerful 
friends”, by which he meant principally the United States and the United 
Kingdom. The Menzies Government took the view that Australia, with its 
vast territory and small population, could not defend itself, but relied on 
its alliances, principally SEATO, ANZUS (the Australian-New Zealand- 
United States security treaty signed in 1951) and to a lesser extent 
ANZAM  (an A u stra lian -N ew  Zea land-U n ited  K ingdom  defence 
arrangement for the Malayan area). This reliance on allies, however, led 
to another fear, that the great and powerful friends might withdraw from 
the region, leaving Australia isolated and defenceless as the dominoes 
fell. The United States and the United Kingdom could never leave the 
north Atlantic, but they could leave southeast Asia. SEATO was 
therefore seen from the outset as a less reliable shield than NATO. From 
the negotiation of the Manila treaty, Australians expressed concern over 
whether SEATO had sufficient “teeth” , by which they meant principally 
whether it was a sufficiently strong guarantee of United States military 
support in times o f need.
Much of Australia’s effort in defence and foreign policy was aimed 
therefore at trying to ensure that the United States would retain its 
presence in southeast Asia. These efforts were further encouraged in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s by signs that the United Kingdom was likely
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to withdraw its forces from east of Suez, in order to concentrate on 
developing its relations with the European continent. At the same time, 
both the United Kingdom and France were becoming increasingly 
reluctant to support western military intervention in Indochina, making 
SEATO look even more “toothless”. Strange as it may now seem, the 
underlying concern o f the Australian Government in the early 1960s was 
that the new Democratic administration of John F. Kennedy might not 
share the determination of its Republican predecessor to resist communist 
expansionism in southeast Asia. Despite the obvious signs that Kennedy 
and his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, were steadily raising the stakes 
in Vietnam, this fear persisted.
The congressional resolution secured by Johnson after the Gulf 
o f Tonkin incident in August 1964 was welcomed by Menzies in the 
Australian federal government’s lower house, the House ofRepresentatives, 
with an almost tangible sense of relief, as a sign that the United States 
was irrevocably committed to maintaining the security of southeast 
Asia.4 Even so, traces of the fear of American withdrawal persisted. In the 
diplomatic exchanges of late 1964 and early 1965 the Australian 
Government offered a battalion of combat troops when the United States 
had not even asked specifically for assistance in that form. It was as 
much an encouragement to the United States to stay the course as it was 
a response to years of pressure from Washington to show that Vietnam 
was a cause for the whole “free world” , not just for the United Slates.
Indeed, one Australian historian has argued that Johnson might 
not have made the major American troop commitments in 1965 had he 
not received such strong and consistent encouragement from Australia.5 
This seems rather unlikely. In all the thousands o f words that have been 
written on United States intervention in Vietnam, based on incalculable 
amounts o f research on official and private records, no-one has seriously 
suggested that Australia had such a crucial influence on United States 
policy. That is not to deny that Johnson undoubtedly welcomed the 
strong support he received from Australia, when so much o f the rest o f 
the world was turning against him. There was clearly a genuine personal 
as well as political rapport between Johnson and Menzies’ successor, 
Harold Holt, which was made manifest in 1966 when Johnson became 
the first incumbent United States president to visit Australia. The visit 
became a triumphal procession, paving the way for Holt's huge election 
victory later in the year. When Holt drowned, in an apparent accident, 
at the end o f 1967, Johnson again visited Australia, this time to attend 
the funeral. His personal attendance was a notable mark o f respect and 
friendship, but there is little evidence to suggest that Australia had any 
significant effect on the course o f American policy, other than to confirm 
Johnson on a course he had already chosen.
While much has been written about the cordiality o f Australian- 
American relations in the Vietnam period, and about the degree to which 
either party was pushed or pulled into commitment by the other, another
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aspect has been less noticed. W hile Australia had been afraid that the 
United States m ight withdraw from the region, it also had a recurring 
fear that W ashington had not always thought through the implications 
o f its policies, running the risk o f precipitating a wider war. During the 
Indochina crisis o f 1954, Australia was clearly concerned by the 
possibility that the “united action” which Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles was encouraging might lead to a larger war, possibly including 
China, and also possibly leading to the use o f nuclear weapons. 
Similarly, during the Laos crisis o f 1961, Australian m inisters feared 
that western intervention might provoke a massive response from North 
Vietnam and China, in turn leading to pressure by the western military 
commanders for the use of nuclear weapons. This fear was a recurring 
theme in Australian consideration of policy towards southeast Asia in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, although it was generally suppressed 
beneath the greater fear o f the spread o f communism.
But the Australian fear of the expansion o f communism through 
southeast Asia was not confined to the possible fall of the “dom inoes” on 
the mainland, running from Vietnam through Laos, Cambodia, Burma, 
and Thailand to Malaya. Australians were usually at least as concerned 
with Indonesia as with Indochina. This highly populated country, 
geographically so close to Australia, was not seen as simply another 
domino. Australian policy-makers always recognized that the struggle 
between communists and anti-communists in Indonesia was largely 
separate from that on the mainland, and o f much greater importance to 
Australia. Developments there took on added urgency in the late 1950s, 
as President Sukarno raised the pressure in his campaign to incorporate 
western New Guinea, which had remained in Dutch hands after the rest 
o f the Netherlands East Indies had gained independence as the Republic 
o f Indonesia. Success in this campaign would mean that Australia in a 
sense shared a land border with Indonesia, because Australia  
administered the eastern half o f the island of New Guinea under a United 
N a tion s  m andate . I f  the In don es ian  C om m un ist P a rty  (PK I) 
subsequently came to power, Australia could thus find itself cheek-by­
jow l with a populous country under communist control, without the 
comfortable insulation of the m iles o f land and sea between mainland 
Australia and mainland southeast Asia.
The major difficulty for Australia was that, on this issue, Canberra 
and W ashington did not see eye-to-eye. The United States did not 
support Dutch and Australian opposition to the Indonesian claim to 
western New Guinea. On the contrary, it saw acquiescence in this 
expansion as the best way to keep Indonesia in the non-communist 
camp. Particularly after the end of 1961, the United States facilitated the 
transfer o f power in western New Guinea, nominally under the aegis of 
the United Nations, from the Dutch to the Indonesians. Australia could 
do nothing but accept the inevitable with as much grace as possible.
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These events underlined the extent to which Australia, by 
restricting its defence expenditure in favour of economic development, 
had made itself dependent on the goodwill of the United States. 
Consequently in the early 1960s the Australian Government took every 
step it could to try to win that goodwill. It informed Washington that it 
would do everything possible to meet any American requests for base 
facilities on Australian soil. Several such agreements were reached, 
providing for co-operation between defence and civilian agencies in 
communications, space research and meteorology. The most important 
was the approval in 1962 for a Very Low Frequency (VLF) naval 
communications station at North-West Cape in Western Australia, to 
facilitate communications to United States submarines operating in the 
Indian Ocean. The Australian Government took a very compliant attitude 
to this request, determined to allow no obstacle to the creation o f a facility 
which would further commit the United Stales to the defence of Australia 
and its region.
It was in this context that Australia considered American requests 
in the early 1960s for advisers and other forms of civilian and military 
assistance in South Vietnam. At the same time, it was receiving similar 
requests for support for the new nation of Malaysia, formed in 1963 by 
joining Malaya, Singapore and former British territories on the island of 
Borneo. The Indonesians had declared a policy of “Confrontation" 
towards Malaysia, involving diplomatic opposition and small-scale 
military harassment. Britain, Australia and New Zealand were supporting 
Malaysia, but once again the Americans were reluctant to take steps that 
would antagonize the Indonesians. The linkage between Vietnam and 
Indonesia in Australian minds was most clearly demonstrated in May 
1964, when the Johnson administration made a concerted eiTort to have 
“more flags” in Vietnam. The Charge d Affaires at the Australian Embassy 
in Washington, Alan Renouf, reported to Canberra that United States 
policy on the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation was not as “firm” 
(that is, supportive of Malaysia) as Australia would wish. Vietnam, he 
therefore suggested, was an area where Australia could pick up credit in 
Washington. Australia should seek “to achieve such an habitual closeness 
of relations with the United States and sense o f mutual alliance that in 
our time of need . . . the United Slates would have little option but to 
respond as we would want”.6
The relationship between Australian policy towards Indochina, 
especially Vietnam, and that towards Indonesia was complex, especially 
in late 1964 and early 1965. Australian policy makers had to balance 
pressure from the United Kingdom, to give greater military support to 
Malaysia against Indonesia, against pressure from the United States, to 
support its effort in South Vietnam. The commitment of an Australian 
battalion of combat troops to Vietnam in April 1965 is widely remembered, 
having been seen at the time and ever since as a significant step in 
Australian defence and foreign policies. By contrast, the similar
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commitment of another battalion only a few weeks earlier, to support the 
British and Malaysian effort in Borneo, has generally been forgotten. The 
crucial decisions on Vietnam by Australian policy-makers were taken in 
an atmosphere of conflicting pressures from two “great and powerful 
friends" over two different conflicts in sou theast Asia. Indeed, uppermost 
in their minds at some crucial times was the possibility o f a third conflict, 
which they thought might be precipitated by Indonesian subversion and 
infiltration into the Australian-administered territories in eastern New 
Guinea. We now know that this never came to pass, just as we know that 
the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation eased in late 1965 and formally 
ended in 1966: but that could not be foreseen by the policy-makers in 
late 1964 and early 1965.
Another element marks a major difference in the paths by which 
the United States and Australia came to be in Vietnam. Unlike the United 
States, Australia had been involved in the campaign against communist 
insurgents in Malaya in the 1950s, generally known as the Malayan 
Emergency. When the state of emergency was declared in 1948 the 
Australian Government, under Labor Prime Minister, J.B. (Ben) Chifley, 
had resisted pressure from London to give military support to the battle 
against the insurgency, but in 1950 the newly elected Liberal Government, 
under Prime Minister Menzies, sent bombers and transport aircraft of 
the Royal Australian Air Force.7 In 1955 the commitment was 
significantly increased when Australia sent troops and other elements 
from all three armed services to Malaya, to join British and New Zealand 
elements in forming the Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve. 
These forces helped the British and Malayan forces fighting the insurgents, 
both before and after Malaya gained its independence in 1957, and until 
the Emergency was declared over in 1960.
In several respects the commitment was comparable with that in 
Vietnam in the 1960s. Australia was responding to a request from one 
of its great and powerful friends to intervene in a campaign to put down 
a communist insurgency in the jungles of southeast Asia, in a country 
which was, or had been, a European colony. It saw the conflict as a 
theatre of the Cold War, not as the suppression of Asian nationalism. 
Australia had reservations about the wisdom of some of the tactics used 
by its major ally, but having taken the decision to intervene it remained 
a firm and loyal ally.
During the early years of the commitment in Malaya there were 
critics who argued that Australia was placing itself on the wrong side of 
Asian nationalism. This western military intervention, they claimed, 
would make Australia highly unpopular as soon as British colonial rule 
was replaced by an independent government. This claim was disproved 
when Malaya gained its independence in 1957 and its freely elected 
government asked the Australian and other Commonwealth forces to 
stay. They did so, and in 1960 the Australian Government could claim 
part o f the credit for a success. The communist insurgency had been
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defeated and Malaya had an independent, pro-western government with 
which Australia had excellent relations. On the basis of this experience, 
it was understandable that a few years later the Australian Government 
was inclined to believe that intervention in Vietnam need not necessarily 
lead to disaster; while the critics who rightly pointed to the dangers of 
involvement in Vietnam had had their credibility weakened, like the boy 
who cried “W olf”.
This is not to say that Australians saw the commitment in 
Vietnam as simply a repetition of the successful venture in Malaya. The 
ethnic, geographic, religious, political, military and other differences, 
which made the position in Vietnam so much more difficult for the west, 
were well understood before the principal Australian commitment was 
made.8 Nevertheless there is evidence that the comparison was very 
much in Australian minds. When considering precedents for the position 
in Vietnam, Americans generally thought of Korea, while Australians 
remembered Malaya.
This raises the question of public attitudes. This paper is 
concerned essentially with governmental decisions, but in a parliamentary 
democracy these decisions must take note of the attitudes of both the 
Opposition in Parliament and extra-parliamentary groups. For the 
Australian Labor Party (ALP) these were the years in the wilderness, as 
it remained out of office at the federal level from 1949 to 1972. The length 
of ALP exclusion was caused largely by a major split in 1955, when a 
section of the party broke away and subsequently formed the Democratic 
Labor Party (DLP). The DLP, predominantly Catholic in membership, 
was vehemently anti-communist in both domestic and foreign policy, 
accusing the ALP of being too sympathetic to communists. Although the 
number of seats won by the DLP in federal and state parliaments was 
small, their influence on the outcome of elections was considerable 
because of the preferential nature of Australian electoral systems. The 
existence of the DLP was therefore an additional reason for the 
government to maintain a resoutely anti-communist stance in foreign 
affairs.
The ALP was weakened in the late 1950s and early 1960s not only 
by this split, but by divisions within its own ranks. Although factions 
within the party were not then as institutionalized as they later became, 
there was a clear division between a left and a right wing, made 
particularly obvious by the issue of the VLF station at North-West Cape. 
The left was suspicious of the United States and reluctant to be 
associated in any way with nuclear weapons; the right emphasized its 
loyalty to the American alliance and was not far from holding the same 
views as the government in most aspects of foreign policy. As policy 
towards southeast Asia came towards the top of the political agenda in 
the 1960s, this division vitiated the ALP’s criticisms of the government’s 
policies. Not until after the government had committed the first battalion 
of combat troops did the ALP unite behind a firm policy of opposition to
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the commitment. Its leader. Arthur A. Calwcll, gave a powerful, and in 
some respects prescient, speech foreshadowing many of the problems 
that were to become evident in later years;9 but by this time it was much 
too late to have any effect on government policy.
Outside Parliament there were several groups who could together 
be categorized as an anti-war movement, but they remained on the 
margins of politics in the 1950s and early 1960s. In 1949 an Australian 
Peace Council was formed, effectively a branch of the World Peace 
Council, bringing together communists, Christians and intellectuals. In 
the 1950s this council organized a major congress, at which the principal 
guest speaker was the Dean of Canterbury, England, Dr Hewlett 
Johnson, widely known as “the Red Dean“ for his admiration for Stalin 
and the Soviet Union. In a highly publicized and controversial tour of 
Australia, Johnson described communism as “a Christian movement 
that is surging upward in every part of the world” and he advised 
Australia not to become involved in an “imperialistic” war, “a war against 
the people” in Malaya.10 Not surprisingly, Menzies and other conservatives 
came to regard the clergymen and other non-communists in the anti-war 
groups as naive dupes of the communists, used to provide a respectable 
front for a movement which existed essentially to support Soviet policies 
and oppose those of the west. Thus, when a group of Anglican bishops 
wrote to Menzies in early 1965 to urge him to support a negotiated rather 
than a military solution in Vietnam, they were given little credibility." 
Their arguments had decidedly more substance than those of Dr 
Johnson and the clergymen known as “the peace parsons” in the 1950s, 
but the Government and the public had become accustomed to dismissing 
views from this quarter as naive and ill-founded.
In fact the anti-war movement by the mid-1960s was becoming 
much less the exclusive property of those who adopted a basically pro- 
Soviet line. The Communist Party of Australia was much weaker than it 
had been in the years immediately after the 1939-1945 war, and middle- 
class liberals were beginning to draw attention to issues in and around 
the Pacific, such as Chinese and French nuclear tests, rather than more 
remote concerns like Algeria and Cuba. Congresses in 1959 and 1964 
helped to give the movement a stronger administrative structure, but 
this was not to become evident until later. As late as October 1964, just 
before the introduction of conscription and six months before the 
principal commitment to Vietnam, an anti-war congress seemed as 
ineffectual and marginal as ever. It was only after the first conscripts 
were sent to Vietnam in 1966 that a significant protest movement 
emerged. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the Government could 
claim broad public support for its policy of close alliance with the United 
States and the United Kingdom in opposition, by military means if 
necessary, to the expansion o f communist influence in southeast Asia.
Australia, therefore, came to be involved in Vietnam by a path 
that was similar, but by no means identical, to that of the United States.
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Australian policy was not merely a clone or an echo o f that o f its 
superpower ally. Australian policy-makers had their own concerns and 
took their own decisions. They deserve the credit for those decisions that 
proved wise, and they cannot escape the blame for those that proved 
unwise.
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